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ABSTRACT 
Following a large number of corporate collapses around the world, for example Enron, 
WorldCom, Ansett, Harris Scarfe, HIH Insurance, One Tel and Parmalat, the ensuing 
profound impact on investors resulted in considerable attention been given to studying 
corporate governance in developed countries such as the United States, the United Kingdom, 
Australia, Germany and Japan. However, there is a dearth of studies on corporate governance 
practice in emerging economies such as Bangladesh. This study attempts to examine the 
corporate governance practice in Bangladeshi companies in the light of two dominate models 
of corporate governance, first the Anglo-American Model and second, the German-Japanese 
Model. This study reduces the dearth of literature on corporate governance in Bangladesh. 
This study finds that many of the characteristics of the Bangladeshi context align with the 
German-Japanese model, such as a concentration of shareholdings by the banks and financial 
institutions or dominant shareholders leading to a high degree of ownership control, a less 
liquid capital market, weak shareholders‟ rights, a dominant agency conflict between 
controlling and minority shareholders, and a limited capacity for boards of directors. The 
study also identifies six specific corporate governance characteristics in relation to current 
corporate government practices in Bangladesh, first a weakly enforced legal and regulatory 
framework, secondly weak institutional controls, thirdly a lacuna of professionals to develop 
a sound corporate governance culture, fourthly a predominance of individual investors, fifthly 
a dearth of foreign or institutional investors, and sixthly limited transparency and weak 
disclosure practices. 
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1.   Introduction 
Corporate governance constitutes the laws, institutions and mechanisms by which 
corporations are managed and controlled.  It is built on the premise that good corporate 
governance in any sector serves the efficient and effective allocation of scarce resources.  
There are many definitions of corporate governance from a broad societal definition to a 
market specific one. For example, Sir Cadbury proposes a broad understanding of the 
concept, stating 
“Corporate governance is concerned with holding the balance between economic and 
social goals and between individual and communal goals.  The corporate governance 
framework is there to encourage the efficient use of resources and equally to require 
accountability for the stewardship of those resources. The aim is to align as nearly as 
possible the interests of individuals, corporations and society” (Sir Adrian Cadbury, 
2000). 
 
An alternate and narrower understanding emerging from financial market approaches 
to defining corporate governance is found in the finance literature. This is typified by the 
definition of corporate governance given by the Asian Development Bank (ADB), which 
describe corporate governance as, 
“(i) a set of rules, that define the relationship between shareholders, managers, creditors, 
the government and stakeholders, (ii) a set of mechanism that help directly or indirectly 
to enforce these rules” (Asian Development Bank 2000, p.5). 
 
Following the large number of corporate collapses around the world, considerable 
research on corporate governance is conducted within the developed countries context, such 
as the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia, Germany and Japan. However corporate 
governance in emerging economy has not been studied as intensively as in the developed 
markets (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Gibson, 2003; Denis and McConnel, 2005). Similarly, 
several reactionary structural changes have been instigated to prevent such events happening 
again in the developed markets context, such as the introduction of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 
2002 in the United States; however the reaction in the emerging market is almost absent. This 
study contributes to the ongoing researches on accounting and/or finance literatures and 
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contributes to reducing the dearth of literatures on corporate governance in emerging 
economies and Bangladesh. The detail organization of this study is as follows.  
First, the two dominant models of corporate governance are examined, these being 
the Anglo-American model and the German-Japanese model, to question whether these 
models which are built on the assumptions of economic rationalism and so privilege 
considerations of providers of capital, are sufficient or appropriate to achieve effective 
corporate governance in Bangladesh. It is examined whether such dominant western 
advanced market models of corporate governance privilege the economic considerations 
while neglecting the balancing interests and considerations of social, individual and 
communal goals of Bangladesh, as identified as good corporate governance by Cadbury 
definition that emerged from the World Bank Global Corporate Governance Forum in 2000.  
Secondly, given the relevance of the geographic location of Bangladesh to ADB‟s Asia-
centric focus and influence, this study investigates the adequacy of the ADB‟s definition and 
two of the financial models embracing of its constructs to explain the Bangladesh specific 
needs and context. Thirdly, this paper contributes to reducing the dearth of literature on 
corporate governance in Bangladesh. 
The following section two of this paper will provide background to this study. Section 
three of the paper will describe and compare and contrast two corporate governance models, 
the Anglo American model and the German-Japanese model. Section four of the paper will 
describe the Bangladeshi corporate governance practices in the light of the features in the 
corporate governance models described in section three of the paper together with a critique 
on the current corporate governance practices in Bangladesh. The last section will draw 
conclusions on the attributes of a suitable model to achieve good corporate governance in 
Bangladesh, consistent with the broad view of the Cadbury definition of corporate 
governance.   
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2. Background to the study  
Although there was no serious corporate scandal in Bangladesh to undermine 
investors‟ confidence, corporate governance is a prevailing issue in Bangladesh for few 
reasons. First, the collapse of State Owned Enterprise Adamjee Jute Mills Ltd1, the largest 
jute mills in the world, second, the inefficiencies and underperformance of privatized textile 
and jute mills (Bhaskar and Khan, 1995; Uddin and Hopper, 2003) and third, the 1996 index 
crash and thereby collapse of the market at Dhaka and Chittagong Stock Exchanges causing 
material losses of thousands of small and first time investors, where the absence of firm level 
corporate governance was identified. It can be inferred from recent events that the operation 
of good corporate governance is essential to the financial health of Bangladesh. A proactive 
approach to corporate governance from Bangladesh requires the implementation and 
enforcement of an appropriate corporate governance model. 
However, it must first be determined, what is an appropriate corporate governance 
model for Bangladesh, an emerging market?  There is a dearth of studies and no study has yet 
identified the blue print of a corporate governance model for an emerging economy such as 
Bangladesh (Machold and Vasudevan, 2004; Rwegasira 2000). Most research on corporate 
governance has concentrated on the mature market situations of the West, and a flow of 
empirical research subsequently investigated whether a control mechanism promotes 
accountability in the developed countries. It can be argued that these research is not of direct 
use to Bangladesh, for example Charkham (1992) suggests that systems and models of 
corporate governance reflect the history, assumptions and value systems whence they came, 
and that while universal principles underpin good corporate governance structures, 
transplanting any specific system or model into alien contexts from which they were 
developed is problematic. Similarly, Paredes questions whether the Anglo-American market 
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based model of corporate governance is appropriate or even possible to implement in 
developing countries that lack advanced markets, second-order institutions such as 
experienced investment bankers, lawyers and accountants to monitor markets, and an 
effective judicial system that is given discretion and legitimacy to apply fiduciary duties 
(Paredes 2005, p 36).   
 
3. Two Alternate Corporate Governance Models 
Much literature emerged in the 1990s focusing on the two most dominant corporate 
governance models, the „Anglo-American‟ model and the „German-Japanese‟ model.  This 
literature compared the two models and documented them as control mechanisms to reduce 
the agency problems (Prowse 1994; Aoki 1995; Prowse 1996; Shleifer and Vishny 1997; 
Berglöf 1997; Alba et al, 1998; Rajan and Zingales 1998; La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, 
Shleifer and Vishny
1
 2000; ADB 2000; Modigliani and Perotti, 2000; Levine 2001 and Bhasa 
2004).  The two models emerged from different ownership financing patterns and hence  
have fundamental differences.  These differences will be discussed in the next two sections.  
 
3.1 The Anglo-American Model. 
The Anglo-American model is recognized as a “market based” system of 
corporate governance, and is distinguished both by the attributes of the prevailing legal 
and regulatory environment (Prowse 1996), and by its “arm‟s length” financing 
arrangements which is most common in the Anglo-American countries (such as United 
States, United Kingdom, Canada, Australia and New Zealand). Under this model share 
ownership is widely dispersed. Shareholders are protected by explicit contracts and 
managers are monitored by an external market for corporate control. Boards of directors 
are usually dominated by outsiders known as independent directors (Kaplan 1994).  
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It is argued that due to the dispersed nature of the shareholding, and typically 
strong management control over a firm, it is very hard for shareholders to be successful in 
bringing a vote to remove management, or to achieve a threat of removing the 
management by the shareholders (Brigham and Gapenski, 1993, p 24). In companies 
identified with the Anglo-American model, strong management control leads to a high 
degree of information asymmetry
2
. Therefore the protection of shareholders‟ interests in 
this model is very poor because shareholders‟ influence on management is weak.  
Consequently, jurisdictions where this model of corporate financing prevails rely heavily 
on laws and transparency to enforce shareholders‟ rights. Shareholders‟ rights under this 
model are protected largely by a liquid equity market, and regulations on information 
disclosure etc.  
Under the Anglo-America model „finance is provided by large number of 
investors‟ and unsatisfactory firm performance often ends up in shareholders selling 
shares or „takeovers play[ing] a key governance role‟ (Prowse, 1994, p 35; LLSV, 2000, p 
17; Denis and McConnell, 2003, p 26). As a result, institutional relationships matter less 
and the market becomes a more dominant medium of governance, hence its identification 
as a “market based” system of corporate governance.  
 
3.2 The German-Japanese Model. 
The German-Japanese model or “bank centered relationship based model” of 
corporate governance is distinguished as “control-oriented” financing (Prowse 1996).  
This model is common in Europe and East Asia, and uniquely emphasizes the long term 
relationship between firms and investors. This model allows corporations to use both a 
large portion of debt and a large portion of equity in the same firm (Prowse, 1990).  In 
these situations the “main bank provides a significant share of finance and governance” 
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(LLSV, 2000, p 17). As corporations under this model keep a close relationship with 
banks and the banks provide a significant share of funds and governance, the banks are in 
the position to monitor the corporation. Hence, this model is also known as the „bank 
centered relationship based model‟ (Kaplan, 1994; Levine, 2001).  
Countries fitting with this model typically have concentrated ownership and less 
liquid financial markets (Prowse, 1996; ADB, 2000). Under this model, managers are 
supposedly monitored by the core investors; it may be a bank, a combination of banks, a 
non-bank financial institution, other corporations, large corporate shareholders or other 
inter-corporate relationships (ADB, 2000). Even under this model some of the banks hold 
the supervisory position of the corporate boards (Cable, 1985). Therefore, this system 
reduces the cost of acquiring information about the firms, and so assists in reducing the 
information asymmetry. 
It is argued that since the financial markets are usually underdeveloped in 
emerging market countries, banks are typically the most important source of external 
financing, and hence this German-Japanese model is most suited to this environment 
(Zysman, 1983; LLSV, 2000; Arun and Turner, 2004).  
 
3.3 Comparison Between the two Corporate Governance Models.  
The Anglo-American Model or market based system,  and the German-Japanese 
Model or bank centered relationship based system of  corporate governance System is 
compared in Table 1 below, which has been adapted from (1994, p 3), Berglöf (1997), 
Khan (1999) and Cernat (2004, p 150).   
Table 1: Market and Bank Based Corporate Governance System 
Mechanisms 
Types of Corporate Governance System 
Anglo-American 
Arm’s Length 
German-Japanese 
Control Oriented 
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Ownership Structures Widely dispersed 
Concentrated in the hands of banks, 
financial institution, other 
corporations or dominant 
shareholders 
Share of Control Oriented 
Finance 
Low High 
Financial Markets Large, highly liquid Not necessarily small, but less liquid 
Monitoring by financial 
institution 
Little Substantial 
Monitoring by individual 
shareholder 
Little Substantial 
Shares of all firms listed on 
the stock exchanges 
Large Small 
Ownership of debt and 
equity 
Dispersed Concentrated 
Investor‟s Orientation Portfolio Oriented Control Oriented 
Shareholder‟s Right Strong Weak 
Use of mechanism for 
separating control and 
capital base 
Limited  Frequent 
Dominant Agency Conflict 
Between Shareholders and 
Management 
Between Controlling and Minority 
Shareholders 
Creditor‟s right Strong 
Strong for close creditors,    weak for 
arm‟s length creditors 
Role of board of directors Important  Limited 
Role of Insolvency and 
Bankruptcy 
Potentially important Quite limited 
Board Independence/ 
Power over management 
Little More 
Market for corporate 
control 
Hostile takeover is the 
correction mechanisms 
Takeover restricted 
 
4. Corporate Governance in Bangladesh: An overview. 
This section will first discuss the context in which corporate governance must operate 
in Bangladesh. Section 4.1 will describe the historical, political, and social that culturally 
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informs the current corporate governance environment.  Section 4.2 will specifically describe 
the business environment of Bangladesh with respect to the ownership, financing and debt of 
corporations in the country. Section 4.3 will describe the existing corporate governance 
enforcement regime in Bangladesh from legal, regulatory and accounting and auditing 
standards perspectives. Final section provides a critique on the corporate governance 
practices in Bangladesh. 
 
4.1 The Historical, Political and Social Background of Bangladesh. 
Bangladesh is a developing country in Asia. It was liberated in 1971 after fighting 
a long war. Soon after the independence the then government adopted socialism as the 
economic and political framework to ensure the so called ‘economic justice’ or 
‘distributive justice’. Socialism was constitutionally accepted as one of the four 
fundamental principles of the state. Government of Bangladesh in an order (the 
Government of Bangladesh Nationalization Order, 1972) nationalized all large and 
medium sized industries including the banking and insurance sectors. Application of the 
Companies Act 1913 was suspended. Through nationalization, the government gained 
control over 92% of the total industrial assets in the country (Islam, 1999; Uddin and 
Hopper, 2003). These industries were most commonly known as the State Owned 
Enterprises (SOEs) or „Public Sector Enterprises‟. By 1974, there were 350 such 
enterprises on which the government exercised control. Consequently the activities of the 
Dhaka Stock Exchange, the symbol of capitalism, were suspended. The government 
preserved the right to nationalize any private enterprise whenever felt necessary (Ahamed 
1978; Banglapedia 2006). As a result, there was no provision for growing the private 
sector enterprises. The economy was similar to that of a socialist country. Bangladesh 
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became one of the poorest countries and its economy one of the slowest growing 
economies in the world.     
Socialism and the nationalization policy of the then government in Bangladesh 
failed. State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) suffered from huge accumulated losses because 
of corruption, mismanagement and a lack of effective monitoring. The World Bank 
(1995, p 89) stated that the biggest public failure in Bangladesh was due to the SOE 
sectors in Bangladesh. The socialist experience only lasted until the change of regime on 
7
th
 November 1975. Socialism was then omitted from the constitution and the market 
economy policy was adopted as an economic phenomenon. The new regime took steps to 
rehabilitate the private sector and facilitate industrialization, such as a revision of 
investment policy, and a reduction of charges on industrial loans by the Development 
Financing Institution (DFI) to help the private sector entrepreneurs on a priority basis.  
Export oriented industries and agricultural production were encouraged as a new 
development strategy (Ahamed, 1978). These strategies encouraged both the domestic 
and foreign private entrepreneurs. The denationalization of the public sector enterprises 
and adoption of the market economy by that government brought in the new era of 
industrialization. The activity of Dhaka Stock Exchange (DSE) resumed in 1976 only 
with nine (9) listed companies (SECB, 2001-02). The new regime denationalized a 
number the state-owned enterprises; which were nationalized immediately after the 
independence. It continued until in recent years and within the period of 1976-1992 about 
500 state owned enterprises (SOEs) were denationalized (Privatization Commission, 
2007). 
4.2 The Business Environment of Bangladesh 
Since the inception of privatization in 1976, many of the corporate bodies, 
including major portions of the banking and jute sectors, paper and textile mills, 
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telecommunications, railways and airlines industries were either reserved for the 
government sector or could not be denationalized due to various difficulties, and so they 
continued to remain under government control. These enterprises presented a very painful 
experience to the nation. For example, The Adamjee Jute Mills Corporations Ltd., the 
largest jute mill in the world collapsed in 2002 costing the jobs of 17,000 workers, 
because of a failure of corporate governance in terms of mismanagement and corruption. 
In the last 30 years that enterprise had an accumulated loss of Taka 11,080 million, 
approximately equivalent to 221.6 million Australian dollars (Star, 2002). Soon after the 
adoption of market economy and the „rehabilitation‟ of the private sector, it experienced a 
huge growth. For example the industrial GDP increased from 7.19% in 1974 to 10.88% in 
1980 (Alauddin, 2004). It increased to 27.8% in 2004 (Bangladesh Bank, 2003-04).  
Although the performances of the State Owned Enterprises (SOE) were very poor 
even before the growth of private sector, the SOE‟s could not survive the competition 
from the huge growth in private sector enterprises over this period.  Consequently the 
focus of corporate governance has shifted from the public sector to the private sector.  
This was also encouraged by other environmental factors such as the stock market 
collapse in 1996 at Dhaka and Chittagong Stock Exchanges, along with inefficiencies and 
underperformance causing collapses of some privatized jute and textile mills (Bhaskar 
and Khan, 1995; Uddin and Hopper, 2003). These failures highlighted greatly the 
importance of good corporate governance in the private sector in Bangladesh.  
The spread of share ownership in public limited companies in Bangladesh is not 
wide, and the economic power of the businesses is concentrated in dominant shareholder 
groups. A few shareholders account for a significant portion of total share value and most 
companies are managed and owned primarily by founding family members, holding 
company (or cross shareholding) or institutional investors leading to very high degrees of 
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concentration of ownership control. Apart from the controlling ownership by foreign 
investors, government and institutions, the joint stock companies in Bangladesh are 
mainly controlled by founding family members. 
Due to underdeveloped, poor and less liquid stock market operations, there is a 
lack of effective corporate governance practice, poor legal enforcement and an excessive 
reliance on bank financing.  Consequently, the control of the companies remains in the 
hands of sponsors, directors, and founding family members leading to a concentrated 
shareholding and control. Most of these concentrated owners hold a position in the 
company management and board, leading to poor monitoring of corporate governance 
practices. Haque et al (2006) documented that the boards of the Bangladeshi firms are 
mostly family dominated and executive management is family aligned. This is typical of 
circumstances found in the countries affected by the Asian Crisis as ADB (2000, p 2) 
documented that,   
“……weaknesses in corporate governance in these countries appear to 
owe much to highly concentrated ownership ……. under-developed 
capital markets, and the weak legal and regulatory framework for investor 
protection” 
 
4.3 The Existing Corporate Governance Regime in Bangladesh 
LLSV
3
 (1998) suggest that like many developing countries the enforcement of law 
in Bangladesh is either very poor or difficult to enforce. The degree of compliance with 
existing financial regulation is historically very low in Bangladesh (Ahmed and Nichollas 
1994). An independent survey in late 2006 with the help of Securities and Exchange 
Commission, Bangladesh revealed that about 55 percent of companies do not comply 
with the good practice guidelines and only about of 33 percent companies appointed the 
independent directors (Jai Jai Din, 2006). Such poor law enforcement is exemplified by 
occurrences of the 1996 Bangladesh stock market collapse, in which a syndicate of 
company directors and brokers had proceedings brought against them by the Securities 
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and Exchange Commission of Bangladesh. Subsequently there is no evidence of 
punishment to these company directors and the brokers of the syndicate, because the 
proceedings were abandoned due to poor enforcement of the law. This example suggests 
that the investor‟s protection is very low in Bangladesh, and so poor corporate 
governance is of increased concern.  
The first instance of corporate governance disclosure in Bangladesh is Padma 
Textile, a subsidiary of the BEXIMCO group of companies, who published two pages in 
their annual report on corporate governance, stating “recognizing the importance of it, the 
board and other senior management remained committed to high standards of corporate 
governance”. Thereafter the report contains a series of statements about “internal 
financial control”, “management structure of the company”, “financial reporting”, etc. 
(cited in Haque, 2002). However companies in Bangladesh are not required to report 
information on corporate governance in their financial reports (OECD, 2003). The 
corporate governance practices were only made mandatory for the first time in 
Bangladesh following the SECB announcement of “Corporate Governance Notification” 
in 2006. 
Section 4.3.1 to follow will describe the existing corporate governance 
enforcement regime from a legal perspective.  Section 4.3.2 will describe the regulatory 
regime, while section 4.3.3 will give an overview of prevailing accounting and auditing 
contributions to the corporate governance environment in Bangladesh.  Section 4.3.4 will 
describe the capital markets in Bangladesh.  
 
4.3.1 Corporate Legal Environment in Bangladesh 
The corporate legal framework in Bangladesh consists of certain Acts and 
Ordinances, numerous subordinate legislative instruments such as orders, notifications, 
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rules, regulations and circulars, which are issued by the Government, the Bangladesh 
Bank, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SECB), the National Board of Revenue 
(NBR)
4
 and other governmental agencies. Moreover the stock exchanges, chambers of 
commerce and other self-regulatory agencies in the private sector also form a part of the 
legal and regulatory framework for corporate governance in Bangladesh.  
On 1
st
 January 1995, the new Companies Act of 1994 came into effect. Among 
several types of legislation, the „Companies Act 1994‟ is the main governing law for the 
companies in Bangladesh. This law was put in effect to provide more accountability and 
openness in managing the companies, leading to greater confidence in the corporate 
environments. However, that Act does not say anything regarding the ultimate share 
ownership, director‟s qualifications, age, composition of the board and the leadership 
structures in the board and management, particularly the role of chairperson
5
 and CEO, 
director‟s responsibility etc. Rather, the law is very much related to the formation, 
management and liquidation of companies.  
The capital markets in Bangladesh are regulated by several types of legislation, 
including the Trust Act 1882, Capital Issues (Continuance of Control) Act 1947, 
Securities and Exchange Ordinance 1969, Securities and Exchange Rules 1987, Securities 
and Exchange Commission Act 1993, Securities and Exchange Commission 
(Amendment) Act 1993, Securities and Exchange Commission (Brokers, Stock-Dealers, 
Stock-Brokers and Authorized Representative) Regulation 1994, Securities and Exchange 
Commission (Merchant Bankers and Portfolio Managers) Regulation 1994, Securities and 
Exchange Commission (Mutual Funds) Regulation 1994, Prohibition of Insider Trading 
Regulation 1995, Initial Public Offering (IPO) Rules 1998, The Depository Act 1999 and 
Margin Rules 1999. Moreover, there are some specific rules and regulations which are 
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issued by SECB from time to time for controlling the operation of stock exchanges, 
companies and share markets.  
 
   4.3.2  Regulatory Control of the Securities and Exchange Commission of Bangladesh.  
The Securities and Exchange Commission, Bangladesh (SECB) was established on 
8
th
 June 1993 under the Securities and Exchange Commission Act, 1993. The SECB holds 
very wide-ranging powers and regulates the activities of the capital market in Bangladesh 
including licensing and regulation of capital market participants and intermediaries such as 
stock exchanges, brokers and dealers, merchant banks and portfolio managers. Much of the 
powers of the SECB are aimed at proper disclosure to investors, which is at the heart of 
good corporate governance. It provides policy direction to the industry and administers the 
securities legislation and acts as an administrative tribunal for decisions on the capital 
markets (SECB, 2000-01). Listed companies are required to submit the copy of their 
Annual Report and the proceedings of their annual general meeting to the SECB. 
Besides regulating the capital markets, the SECB has the other objectives of 
promoting investors‟ awareness including investment guidelines and the correct format for 
lodging a complaint, caution notices regarding the circulation of fake shares, an investors‟ 
education program and the provision of training for intermediaries of the securities market 
(SECB, 2005). 
 
   4.3.3   Financial Reporting, Accounting and Auditing Standards  
Two professional accounting bodies, the Institute of Chartered Accountants of 
Bangladesh (ICAB) and the Institute of Cost and Management Accountants of 
Bangladesh (ICMAB) regulate the accounting profession in Bangladesh. ICAB is the 
national professional accounting body of Bangladesh established under the Bangladesh 
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Chartered Accountants Order (Presidential Order Number 2 of 1973). The Institute of 
Cost and Management Accountants of Bangladesh (ICMAB) was established in 1977 
under the „Cost and Management Accounting Ordinance‟ mainly to regulate the Cost and 
Management Accounting profession in Bangladesh. Both the accounting bodies are 
fostering the acceptance and observance of International Accounting Standards (IAS) and 
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) and their adoption as Bangladesh 
Accounting Standards (BASs). The Companies Act 1994 allows the members of both 
ICAB and ICMAB to audit companies to ensure that their accounts conform to all 
Bangladesh Accounting Standards.  
To ensure the transparency, accountability and good governance in the corporate 
sector effective from February 2000, the Securities and Exchange Commission 
Bangladesh by a notification on 29
th
 December 1997 required all listed companies to 
abide by „Accounting Standards‟ adopted by ICAB and ICMAB as Bangladesh 
Accounting Standards (BASs). Thus these accounting standards are mandatory for all 
companies listed in Dhaka and Chittagong Stock Exchanges.  
 
    4.3.4  Capital Markets in Bangladesh 
The Bangladeshi capital market is one of the smallest in Asia, and has a lot of 
problems including a non-developed securities market, investor non-awareness, a lack of 
research, non-professionalism of the brokerage business and market intermediaries, and a 
tendency towards unethical gains by insider trading and a lack of transparency 
(Chowdhury, 2000 and SECB, 2002-03).  
By the end of June, 2006 there were 303 securities of 256 companies listed on the 
DSE with a market capitalization of Taka 225.30 billion (SECB, 2006). The „All Share 
Price Index‟ at Dhaka Stock Exchange was introduced on 16th September 1986. The 
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Dhaka Stock Exchange is a self regulated non-profit organization. Its activities are 
regulated by its „Articles of Association‟ and „rules and regulations‟ and „by-laws‟ along 
with the Securities and Exchange Ordinance, 1969, Companies Act 1994 and Securities 
and Exchange Commission Act, 1993. 
The Chittagong Stock Exchange (CSE) was established as a Public Limited 
Company in April 1995. Similar to Dhaka Stock Exchange, the activities of Chittagong 
Stock Exchange are regulated by its „Articles of Association‟ and „rules and regulations‟ 
and „by-laws‟ along with the Securities and Exchange Ordinance, 1969, Companies Act 
1994 and Securities and Exchange Commission Act, 1993. By the end of June 2006 there 
were 213 securities of 196 companies listed with CSE with a market capitalization of 
Taka 196.34 billion (SECB, 2006). 
In view of the features of the corporate governance practices described in this 
section, the characteristics of the Bangladesh corporate governance situation are 
summarized in Table 2 below. 
Table 2: Characteristics of the Bangladesh Corporate Governance 
Corporate Governance 
Characteristics 
Bangladesh Situation 
Ownership Structures Concentrated in the hands of banks, financial institution, 
other corporations or dominant shareholders 
Share of control oriented 
finance 
High concentration of control by a small number of 
shareholders. These are predominately either from family 
investors or financial institutions.   
Financial Markets Small, not very liquid. 
Monitoring by financial 
institutions 
Supposed to be extensive, but really very little.  
Monitoring by individual 
shareholders 
Yes, if family or financial institution because in a position of 
power and knowledge to do so.  No, for smaller investors as 
they are not educated to do so.  No formal policing of 
structures – regulations.  
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Shares of all firms listed on 
the stock exchanges 
Small – still a large number state owned enterprises not 
listed. In 2005 only 20 privatized through sale of shares 
(Rahman, 2007). 
Ownership of debt and 
equity 
Concentrated. 
Investor‟s Orientation Control, not portfolio – family owned. 
Shareholder‟s Rights Weak – lack of knowledge about their rights. 
Dominant Agency Conflict Between Controlling and Minority Shareholders. 
Creditor‟s Rights Strong for banks, weak for commercial. 
Role of Board of Directors Limited. 
Role of Insolvency and 
Bankruptcy 
Limited – high debt financing involvement. 
Board Independence / Power 
Over Management 
Therefore, there is an absence of any accountability structure of 
management to the board. In case of State Owned Enterprises 
(SOEs), when the Chairperson of the Board is also a cabinet 
minister, there is a tendency to treat the SOE as a government 
department rather than a corporate entity (Rahman, 2007). 
Market for corporate control Takeovers are absent as the ownership is highly 
concentrated in the hands of family and lack of takeover 
regulations and due to non-efficient market.  
 
From the above description of the Bangladeshi context, it can be concluded that 
many of the characteristics of the Bangladeshi context align with the German-Japanese 
model. However, beyond this analysis, five themes of corporate governance 
characteristics are identified as specific to Bangladesh. The study also identifies six 
specific corporate governance characteristics in relation to current corporate government 
practices in Bangladesh, first a weakly enforced legal and regulatory framework, 
secondly weak institutional controls, thirdly a lacuna of professionals to develop a sound 
corporate governance culture, fourthly a predominance of individual investors, fifthly a 
dearth of foreign or institutional investors, and sixthly limited transparency and weak 
disclosure practices. 
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Temple (2002) argues that Bangladesh‟s public sector operates with weak 
accountability and poor transparency, suggesting that this is conducive to corrupt and 
inefficient practices. He also makes recommendations to improve the corporate 
governance including the establishment of Audit Committees in all listed companies 
having adequate shareholder participation, the computerization of operations and the 
strengthening of the Company Registrar.  Similarly, the World Bank (2003) Report on the 
Observance of Standards and Codes Bangladesh argues that both accounting and auditing 
practices in Bangladesh are institutionally weak in terms of their regulation, compliance 
and their enforcement of the accounting standards and professional rules.  Often, audits 
are not conducted in accordance with international best practice. They suggest this 
problem is further aggravated because graduates do not join the Bangladeshi accounting 
profession because it is not given the prestige of a rewarding career. Also, in the 
environment of superseded legal requirements, general noncompliance with standards and 
ineffective policing mechanisms, an absence of professional ethics, and poor quality 
professional education all contribute to an unsatisfactory corporate governance regime in 
Bangladesh.  
 
5. Conclusions 
The weaknesses in corporate governance in Bangladesh identified in the discussion 
section above require an explanation beyond a market framed analysis as used in the Asian 
Development Bank definition of corporate governance. Indeed, as the German-Japanese 
model is identified as going part way to explaining the corporate governance situation of 
Bangladesh, the Asian Development Bank itself is a complicit player in the situation. It could 
be argued that a mechanistic approach to corporate governance as described in its definition 
in the introductory section of this paper facilitates its position of power and influence as a key 
creditor of corporations in Bangladesh. Rather, the broader definition of Cadbury (2000) is 
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sensitive to the Bangladesh context. Given the limited resources of an emerging economy, 
Bangladesh must find a balance between economic efficiency and community stewardship 
inherited in the form of its State Owned Enterprises. Alignment of stakeholders is difficult 
given wide gaps in both opportunity and education of investors. A wide share ownership is 
possible only through egalitarian wealth distribution, which is a characteristic of both models 
described, but not one of the Bangladesh context.   
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Notes:  
 
1
 Hereinafter referred to as LLSV 
2
 This is the situation, when firm managers will know more about the firm than that of shareholders. Managers 
will try to use the information about the firm, which is not available to the shareholders, for their own benefit. 
3
 Rafael La Porta, Florenzio Lopez-de Silanes, Andrei Shleifer and Robert Vishny- sometimes referred to as the 
“gang of four” 
4
 Entities in dealing with the taxation affairs of the country 
5
 Instead of using the term chairman, the chairperson is used throughout this study as it will cover both the male 
and female leader. 
